On the battlefield itself, tactical, operational and organizational factors play their part. There is of course no single, simple explanation of the poor performance of the Russian armed forces in the present war. To all such prognosticators I would simply say, as I said at the time of the Battle of Kiev: Remember Tannenberg. Others, perhaps the majority, may simply find it impossible to believe that a major world power, armed to the teeth, can be defeated in war by a much smaller country. Putin’s histrionic Russian nationalism touches a chord, it no doubt reflects ideological embarrassment: Their narrative of the Russo-Ukrainian War has been falsified. Among the so-called nationalist conservatives, for whom V. Stubborn resistance to the idea that Russia is losing the war may reflect a natural reluctance to admit that one’s judgement was at fault. In the six months since the Russian Army’s defeat in the battle of Kiev became obvious, that evidence has continued to pile up. It was tangible evidence as well of the faulty judgement of the aforementioned Western observers, many of whom lay a claim to military expertise. The Ukrainian countryside became littered with abandoned, burned-out tanks and vehicles: tangible, humiliating evidence of the Russian Army’s surprising incompetence. Confronted with the spirited resistance of the Ukrainian Army and people, the invaders faltered and recoiled. And as the weeks passed with Russian troops bogged down north of Kiev, it came to be realized that Putin’s legions were far less battleworthy than previously supposed. It was deemed likely if not inevitable that after little more than thirty years of independent existence, Ukraine would revert to its former status as a Russian vassal state.īut the Russian plan-to seize Kiev with thunderclap suddenness, deposing the Ukrainian government and replacing it with a puppet regime-misfired. Seventy-two hours: That was how quickly they thought Kiev would fall, leading to the collapse of all Ukrainian resistance. Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine last February. Although the battle actually took place near Allenstein (Olsztyn), Hindenburg named it after Tannenberg, 30 km (19 mi) to the west, in order to avenge the Teutonic Knights' defeat at the First Battle of Tannenberg 500 years earlier.That was the confident, even smug, assessment of many observers in Western Europe and America when V. The almost miraculous outcome brought considerable prestige to Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his rising staff-officer Erich Ludendorff. It is also notable for the failure of the Russians to encode their radio messages, broadcasting their daily marching orders in the clear, which allowed the Germans to make their movements with the confidence they would not be flanked. The battle is particularly notable for fast rail movements by the German Eighth Army, enabling them to concentrate against each of the two Russian armies in turn, first delaying the First Army and then destroying the Second before once again turning on the First days later. ![]() A series of follow-up battles (First Masurian Lakes) destroyed most of the First Army as well and kept the Russians off balance until the spring of 1915. The battle resulted in the almost complete destruction of the Russian Second Army and the suicide of its commanding general, Alexander Samsonov. The Battle of Tannenberg, also known as the Second Battle of Tannenberg, was fought between Russia and Germany between 26 and 30 August 1914, the first month of World War I.
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